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Abstract
Using data on 57 German industries we find that industries participating in voluntary agreements reduce
their CO2-emissions up to 30% compared to industries not participating in voluntary agreements for
the period 1995 to 2010. The success of these agreements can be explained by a credible threat of the
regulatory agency to impose taxes.
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1 Introduction
Voluntary agreements (VA) as an alternative to environmental regulations and taxes are a widely applied
tool to reduce harmful greenhouse gases, especially CO2-emissions.
VAs, as in the case for many European countries, are a bargained agreement between the industry and a
regulatory agency. They have the advantage that they are more flexible from a firm’s point of view, instead
of mandatory taxes or goals set by a regulatory agency. This could increase the development (or use) of more
efficient technologies on the industries own terms. Furthermore, VAs can be less costly to implement than
mandates (Jochem and Eichhammer 1999).
VAs are enforced by a threat of the regulatory agency to impose taxes or other regulations if the VA is
not followed by the industry. However, the effect of a VA on reducing emmissions could be less if the threat
is non-credible, e.g. an industry just announces a goal to avoid mandatory actions and remains inactive in
reaching the set goals (Glachant 2002). Furthermore, compared to emission quotas and trading schemes they
could have lower bargained emission targets to begin with (Glachant 2002, Grepperud 2002).
However, an econometrical judgement of their potential success in reducing CO2-emissions is mostly
missing. Most studies are of descriptive nature and focus on one (e.g. at the firm level) or just a few
industries (Faggi et al. 2014, Abeelen et al. 2013, Boyd 2013, Lo 2012, Rezessy and Bertoldi 2011, Chidiak
2002, Krarup and Ramesohl 2002, Johannsen 2002).
Here, we make use of a quasi natural experiment in Germany where 14 mostly energy-intense industries
announced a VA in 1995 and 43 industries did not. This allows us to test the local average treatment effect
of a VA. In 1995 the German industry association (BDI) and ten of its members announced to reduce CO2-
emissions up to 30% until 2005 compared to the base year 1990. The reason for the industry to negotiate a
VA was to avoid mandatory energy (and eco) taxes (Jochem and Eichhammer 1999).
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Descriptive studies based on German industries (Arens 2012, RWI 2011) find a positive effect of VAs on
reducing CO2-emissions. Using a regression model, we complement these findings. Firms participating in a
VA do indeed reduce their emissions compared to firms not participating in a VA by almost 30%.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces to the data and to our empirical model. Section
3 discusses our results. The paper concludes in section 4.
2 Empirical strategy and data
We have GDP, energy and pollution data on 57 different German industries at the two and three digit level
of aggregation. These industries range from energy-producing industries, manufacturing, agriculture and
to different service related industries. Annual valued added GDP data are from the economic accounting
system (Inlandsproduktrechnung 2012) and are available at the industry level until 2010. Energy-related
CO2-emissions are from the environmental accounting system (Umweltgesamtrechnung 2013). Finally, we
take energy-use data from the AG Energiebilanzen (2014), Destatis (2014) and from the RWI (2011).
To estimate the effect of VAs on energy-related CO2-emissions we use the following model:
CO2it = α+ β1V Ait + β2GDPit + β3Energyit + τ + ωt + γi + it (1)
VA is the main variable of interest. It is a binary variable and takes the value one if an industry is an VA,
and zero if otherwise. If industries in a VA do indeed reduce CO2-emissions, we expect the variable VA to
have a negative effect on CO2-emissions.
The parameter τ represents developments common for all industries, e.g. the increased use of alternative
energy sources in the production (RWI 2011) or structural changes in the East German in the 1990s (”Wall-
Fall-Effect”, Jochem and Eichhammer 1996). The parameter ωt reflects time fixed effects, e.g. developments
affecting every industry the same in a given year. This could be a recession for instance. Industry-specific
but time invariant characteristics are represented by the parameter γi. Finally, it is the usual (robust) error
term.
3 Results
Basic Results
Our results are presented in Table 1. We show results for a baseline model (Model 1) and a model including a
VA-specific trend (Model 2). Most of the variation in CO2-emissions is explained by energy use, as expected,
given we use energy-related emission data. Thus, industries producing energy, as well as energy-intense
industries have the highest potential to reduce CO2-emissions in the production of goods and services. To
no surprise, these firms also participate in a VA because a mandatory eco-tax could hurt them the most
(Jochem and Eichhammer 1999). Furthermore, the participation in a VA could also create a positive image
in the public for these rather heavy polluting industries (Lyon and Maxwell 2003).
We find that industries participating in a VA emmit up to 30% less CO2 than firms not participating in
a voluntary agreement. In this light, VAs can be seen as a successful tool in reducing emissions.
Some Dynamics
Here, we test if the participation in a VA has a long term effect in reducing CO2-emissions. We use five leads
to model the dynamics. Results can be found in column 3 of Table 1 (Model 3). We exclude the year 1995
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from this analysis because most VAs where announced in the middle of the year and it is more likely that
efforts to reduce CO2-emissions started in 1996.
We find that the firms participating in a VA do continously decrease their emissions, e.g. by using more
energy-efficient technologies (RWI 2011).
Table 1: Industries - 1995 to 2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
VA -.253*** -.291***
(.079) (.084)
VAt+1 -.101*
(.055)
VAt+2 -.124***
(.036)
VAt+3 .037*
(.022)
VAt+4 -.125***
(.026)
VAt+5 -.172***
(.052)
Energy .436*** .439*** .308**
(.162) (.162) (.128)
GDP .013 .017 .055
(.048) (.046) (.051)
Trend -.016*** -.017*** -.007
(.002) (.003) (.005)
VA*Trend - .003 .001
(.003) (.005)
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.97 0.97 0.98
n 824 824 606
Note: significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses and the ad-
justed R2 is reported. Energy data and GDP data
are log-transformed. GDP is measured as value added
GDP. Voluntary agreements (VA) includes all indus-
tries adopting a voluntary agreement.
4 Conclusion
If industries face a credible threat (e.g. environmental taxes) voluntary agreements (VA) can be successful
in reducing CO2-emissions. The German government announced that if industries do not reach the agreed
CO2-targets a energy tax and other mandatory regulations will be implemented (Jochem and Eichhammer
1999). Thus, this credible threat ensured that the industries participating in these VAs reach the agreed
targets (RWI 2011). However, the full potential of CO2-reduction is not reached if some industries do not
participate in these VAs. Mechanisms (e.g. tradeable pollution rights) targeting all industries can decrease
emissions beyond the agreed level in VAs. Especially in the light of global warming unused potentials in
reducing CO2-emissions should be addressed (IPCC 2014)
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